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Softening the Stalemate
In order for the Church model to have optimal influence on psychological science, we encourage 
moving away from assuming an all-knowing perspective so that the model can be applied to a 
world where there are competing truth claims and motivations for holding religious beliefs and 
convictions. People tend to prefer their own view of God, and most also believe their own view of 
God is in line with the available evidence. Because of this, we reach a stalemate quickly—which 
happens to correspond to the intractable religious disagreements and conflicts we see in real life. In 
order to soften the stalemate, people must engage in dialogue not simply by exchanging reasons 
and arguments for their beliefs, but also by being willing to understand and be open to another’s 
perspective on how to constitute and evaluate the evidence.
We have presented what we see as challenges to the Church model gaining traction within psycho-
logical science. There may be a perspective from which it is theoretically possible to judge how strongly 
one ought to weigh the evidence behind particular beliefs, but we are further from that possibility in 
domains related to religious beliefs and convictions than, for example, beliefs regarding the likelihood 
that someone committed a crime. In closing, we admit that the highly contextual nature of our model 
may have substantial weaknesses that will limit its influence within many philosophical circles, and we 
would be interested in understanding these weaknesses and possible ways to shore them up.
Part 3b: Trenches, Evidence, and Intellectual 
Humility
Ian M. Church
Hillsdale College, Saint Louis University, USA
It seems as though I might have been happier with Davis and Hook’s understanding of intellectual 
humility (IH) than they were with mine! In their response, they leveled six complaints against my 
account of IH, which I think can be roughly categorized into two general worries:
1. The worry that my account of IH does not fit with the real world or have application “in the 
trenches.” (See their first and second complaints.)
2. The worry that my account overemphasizes “evidence” to the exclusion of other plausible 
facets of IH. (See their third, fourth, fifth, and sixth complaints.)
Contrary to the first worry, I will suggest that the complexities and limitations of my account actu-
ally enjoy an admirable fit with the real world—and that demanding less from an account of IH 
does not account better for what we find in the trenches. And contrary to the second worry, I will 
note that Davis and Hook seem to have misunderstood my view.
The Trenches
Life in the trenches, in the real world, is messy. It’s complex. Properly understood, virtues are often 
going to be extremely difficult to viably measure across personality types, social dynamics, cultural 
contexts, and so on. In giving an abstract and complex view of the virtue of IH, it seems to me that I 
am actually tracking the complexity we find in the trenches, in the real world. When Davis and Hook 
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40. And to be sure, contrary to Davis and Hook’s second complaint, there is an important difference between 
something being open-ended and sufficiently abstract and it being “undefined.”
complain that my account of IH is too complex to be easily measured, my first response is, “That’s life 
in the trenches!” We shouldn’t always expect virtues to yield easy measurements. Sure, we can give a 
simple definition of IH so that it yields easy measurements, but if ease of measurement is what’s driving 
our definitions, then there is a real chance our definitions won’t fully capture the virtue. Even if there 
is some insurmountable hurdle blocking a straightforward means of measuring IH as I’ve described it, 
that doesn’t mean that there isn’t plenty of extremely valuable measurement work to be done.
For example, we might think that intellectual humility largely corresponds with the absence of 
dogmatism; as such, developing a straightforward measure along these lines would be extremely 
valuable and relevant. But, as I’ve highlighted in my previous statements, we’d simply be remiss if 
we tried to conflate IH with the absence of dogmatism. If we are going to try to develop an account 
of intellectual humility that applies across contexts, cultures, personalities, and belief types—from 
the belief that 2 + 2 = 4 to religious beliefs—then we are simply going to need an open-ended and 
sufficiently abstract account to work with.40 And even though this might mean that my account of 
IH mirrors the intractability of some disagreements (e.g. religious disagreements), it can neverthe-
less help explain why such disagreements are so intractable. In the end, I consider it a virtue of my 
account that it provides a broad enough framework of IH that it can apply across a full range of 
cases and track the complexities and stalemates of life “in the trenches.”
Evidence
In my opening statement, I argued that intellectual humility is the virtue of accurately tracking what 
one could non-culpably take to be the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. Davis and 
Hook seem to think that positive epistemic status merely amounts to some strict notion of evidence. 
But I explicitly tried to block such an interpretation. I explicitly left the notion of positive epistemic 
status open (letting “a thousand flowers blossom”), and I certainly did not limit myself to a strict 
notion of evidence. By leaving my understanding of positive epistemic status open, my account is 
extremely adaptable; indeed, it is adaptable to whatever we find we need in the trenches—whether 
it’s evidence, social epistemology, character virtues, and/or whatever. So when Davis and Hook 
repeatedly highlight dynamics of IH that go beyond some strict sense of evidence, this is simply in 
no obvious way problematic for my account.
Conclusion
In my opening statement I elucidated an intuitive and widely applicable account of IH, and I 
explained how it is at least conceptually possible to be both dogmatic and intellectually humble. 
And in their response, Davis and Hook very helpfully sketched some challenges my account of IH 
might face in the psychological or clinical arena. Thankfully, however, I think these challenges can 
be met or dissolved. And while I certainly strive for intellectually humility in my beliefs regarding 
IH and religious commitments, I do not think I have any reason yet for thinking that my original 
views enjoy any less positive epistemic status.
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